

M_R Book Reviews

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impact by Bernard M. Bass. 216 pages. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Mahwah, NJ. 1997. \$49.95.

"Better leaders are transformational more frequently; less adequate leaders concentrate on correction and passivity." So reads one conclusion posited by Bernard M. Bass in *Transformational Leadership*. This statement sums up only one of the lessons the reader can glean from this book.

This book allows readers to delve into a portion of the research and

development that has gone into quantifying and explaining the concept of transformational leadership. However, there are other models or methods of leadership. Bass discusses two: passive, which includes laissez-faire and management by exception (MBE-P), and active, which includes management by exception (MBE-A), transactional or contingent reward and transformational. In the passive method, the leader waits for people to make mistakes or for errors to occur before taking action to correct the situation. In the active method, the leader ac-

tively monitors situations in order to take immediate corrective actions.

Bass cites four components of transformational leadership: idealized influence (charisma), inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. In "idealized influence," leaders are seen as possessing certain characteristics that make followers identify with and emulate their behavior and beliefs. "Inspirational motivation" leaders motivate and inspire followers by providing meaning and challenges to their followers' work. "Intellectual stimulation" leaders help

followers expand their capabilities and develop more skills, thus becoming more competent. "Individualized consideration" leaders, acting as coach or mentor, pay particular attention to each follower's needs for achievement and growth.

Bass shows that transformational leadership is more effective and satisfying than transactional leadership. And, transactional leadership is more effective and satisfying than strictly corrective and passive forms of leadership. Passive leadership is least effective and satisfying.

Bass provides noteworthy insight into transformational leadership components but acknowledges that more research would provide more adequate understanding and help us make fuller use of transactional and transformational leadership. He also tries to shed some light onto the idea of "charismatic leaders," their behaviors and the key personality traits underlying those behaviors.

For those who want to delve deeper into this discussion, there are two other books that complement this one. They are *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (Bernard M. Bass, The Free Press, New York, 1985) and *Leadership for the Twenty-First Century* (Joseph C. Rost, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1991).

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THE STUFF OF HEROES: The Eight Universal Laws of Leadership by William A. Cohen. 272 pages. Longstreet Press, Atlanta, GA. 1998. \$24.00.

In what turned out to be brilliant "casting," Major General William A. Cohen selected former US Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogleman to write the foreword of Cohen's practical guide to applied military leadership—*The Stuff of Heroes*. Fogleman is the only former member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent memory to voluntarily step down from his exalted position because of a matter of principle and honor. By his deeds, he showed that he not only understood the requirements of heroic military leadership,

he actually lived its principles. Fogleman's dramatic demonstration of moral courage, loyalty and strength of character in refusing to participate in the "scapegoating" of a subordinate is a living example of exactly the "stuff of heroes" Cohen writes of in this excellent little book on leadership.

None of Cohen's "eight universal laws" of leadership should surprise those who have served in the US military forces for any length of time. However, he contributes to the body of literature by presenting them



in a simple, straightforward manner and includes many examples of how these "laws" have been applied. Most leaders know these laws or variations of them, but not all have the moral courage to live by them.

The laws are the foundation for a military leadership worthy of the name—maintain absolute integrity, know your stuff, declare your expectations, show uncommon commitment, expect positive results, take care of your people, put duty before self and get out in front. Cohen exhorts those who would benefit from adopting these laws to put them into action, thereby validating their utility, applicability and timelessness.

The book is more than just a checklist of the bedrock principles of "heroic" military leadership. It presents the laws in a logical, cohesive manner, permitting the leader—whether military or civilian—to use the book as a teaching text for developing and schooling the next genera-

tion of leaders. The laws are further validated by the use of many appropriate examples taken from the experiences of current dedicated, competent and caring military leaders of character and principle. Cohen includes the following outstanding leaders exemplifying those traits: General Richard Trefry, former inspector general of the US Army; General Andrew Goodpaster, former NATO commander and US Military Academy superintendent during a time of unprecedented ethical crisis; and General Frederick Kroesen, former US Army Europe commander in chief.

For professionals, it is always instructive and beneficial to relearn the important lessons of principled leaders and continue studying and teaching these important laws. As Trefry notes, "This is a profession that requires a lifetime of service to teach yourself that you never know everything. As a matter of fact, when you stop learning and teaching, you stop growing." Well said, Sir.

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INVENTING GRAND STRATEGY AND TEACHING COMMAND: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered by Jon Tetsuro Sumida. 164 pages. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD. 1997. \$24.95.

Using Zen Buddhism as a model, author Jon Tetsuro Sumida argues that US Navy officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) is like a great master who can only be understood through "submission to the authority . . . , scrupulous attentiveness and prolonged mental exertion." It is apparent that Sumida has undertaken such a task.

Mahan saw naval history and theories as means to enhance the quality of naval officers' decision making, and he professed that it was the man, rather than the ship, who served the cause of victory in war. This might be a lesson the military community wants to revisit as it enters the information-warfare age.

The key tenets typically ascribed

to Mahan are that naval supremacy precedes national greatness, and naval operations directed by certain strategic principles result in decisive naval victory. Yet Sumida maintains that these and other interpretations of Mahan are, at best, "misleading to the point of error."


Sumida's serious book attempts "to correct widespread and longstanding misperception of [Mahan's] treatment" of naval grand strategy and the art and science of command. In so doing, he provides a new perspective from which to understand Mahan and his writings. Sumida focuses on Mahan's main themes while tracing the evolution of Mahan's thoughts on five subelements: political, political-economic, governmental, strategic and professional arguments. Central to Sumida's thesis is the paradox of "a body of famous work [Mahan's] that has received a great deal of study but has been misunderstood completely." Sumida wants his book to serve as a point of departure for future study and discussion that will resolve the paradox.

Part of the misperception concerning naval grand strategy concerns the evolution of Mahan's thoughts on the need for naval supremacy, which embodied the government argument. Sumida traces Mahan's thoughts on the role of sea power, from the need for naval supremacy to a navy adequate to serve as a deterrent to one that could form part of a "transnational naval consortium"—a position likely to cause consternation among sea power advocates. Sumida's arguments are well laid out, using Mahan's major works. However, the question remains unanswered of whether Mahan's last position was the correct position. Obviously Sumida believes it is.

The other misperception Sumida attempts to correct is the view that Mahan advocated a Jominian-like system of rules to govern naval command and decision making. He argues that Mahan was more like Carl von Clausewitz in that Mahan believed command in war placed greater emphasis on art than on science. Much of the evidence Sumida

uses to support his contention is drawn from Mahan's lesser works, making it difficult for the average scholar to critique this position. Yet, Sumida's arguments transcend time because they reflect current debates about critical leadership issues. Sumida also describes Mahan's struggle with the role of doctrine in ensuring effective command in war and the liability of it becoming a set of rigid principles that impair judgment—an issue present today.

Those who have studied the



works of Mahan beyond *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (1890), will appreciate Sumida's extensive research on Mahan and should enjoy a lively debate about the arguments he puts forth. Those who aspire to be serious students of Mahan will appreciate the extensive bibliography and the selected analytical index.

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ONCE AN EAGLE by Anton Myrer and John W. Vessey. 832 pages. US Army War College Foundation Press, Carlisle, PA. 1997. \$15.00.

The US Army War College Foundation Press recently reprinted *Once An Eagle*—the book some have called America's *War and Peace*. *Once an Eagle* was first published in 1968 to wide critical acclaim. After the story appeared as a 1970s' 12-

hour television miniseries, the book returned to the *New York Times* best seller list and reached number one. It has been published in 19 languages.

Once and Eagle is one of the most important military novels ever written. In its stark and realistic descriptions of men in combat, it ranks with Erich Maria Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* (Fawcett Books, New York, 1995) and Stephen Crane's *The Red Badge of Courage* (Tor Books, New York, 1997). In its penetrating analysis of human and technical challenges and leadership and command's moral dilemmas, it is a fitting companion to Herman Wouk's *The Caine Mutiny* (Little Brown and Co., New York, 1992) and C.S. Forester's *The General* (The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co., Inc., Baltimore, 1988).

Once an Eagle is the story of Sam Damon, a Nebraska farm boy who wants to go to West Point but does not have the political connections necessary to gain an appointment. He enlists in the regular Army and serves in the 1916 Mexican border operation. Two years later, in France, he becomes an infantry squad leader and wins the Medal of Honor and a battlefield commission.

At World War I's end, Damon, a major, must revert to the rank of first lieutenant to remain in the postwar Army. As a company grade officer, he survives through the long, lean interwar years, moving from post to dreary post in the American west and to overseas bases such as the Panama Canal Zone and the Philippines.

Author Anton Myrer paints a sharp portrait of the Depression-era US Army. He accurately portrays the often-degrading conditions endured by soldiers' families, including those of George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton Jr. and Omar Bradley, as the men honed their professional skills in preparation for the expected war.

Throughout Damon's career, he is overshadowed by Courtney Massengale. Although Massengale does not have Damon's leadership skills or combat experience, he is seen as

the epitome of the ambitious, poised and polished staff officer.

Damon, continually dogged by his "Mustang" origins, resolutely defends enlisted soldiers and their interests during an era when enlisted soldiers were considered little more than unskilled laborers. Damon's critics, Massengale foremost among them, dismiss him as never having made the psychological shift from being a noncommissioned officer to being an officer.

When World War II begins, Damon is sent to the southwest Pacific, where his competence in combat eventually leads to division command. Near the war's end, Damon once again faces Massengale, now Damon's corps commander. Damon's division is decimated in a Japanese counterattack after Massengale prematurely commits the division's reserve elsewhere for no sound operational purpose other than that of receiving the glory of having captured intact a Japanese-held city. Damon survives the action but is faced with the moral conundrum of how—or even whether—to expose the powerful and politically connected Massengale. The story easily could have ended here. But, in a short, final section, Myrer extends the story by following Damon—and Massengale—into the early years of the Vietnam conflict.

Recalled in 1962 from retirement as a lieutenant general, Damon is sent on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam (called Khotiane in the book). Damon must once again confront Massengale, who is now a four-star general and the commander of the military advisory group. Damon discovers and attempts to derail an effort by Massengale to bring the United States into a full-scale war in Southeast Asia. However, before Damon can act, he is killed in a guerrilla grenade attack.

In creating the character of Sam Damon, Myrer provides the benchmark for what an American officer can and should be. Damon, though, is human and, therefore, far from perfect. What sets him apart is that he continually analyzes himself and tries to be the best officer he can be. On another level, Damon is a meta-

phor for the US Army itself in the first seven decades of the 20th century. It came of age in World War I, achieved greatness in World War II and withered in Vietnam.

This new edition of *Once an Eagle* carries a foreword by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey Jr., whose own career might well offer the closest parallel to that of the fictional Damon. Current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Henry H. Shelton writes: "Sam Damon has been and will be a beacon of moral and physical courage for young American warriors."

By republishing this book, the US Army War College Foundation has made this vital work accessible to a new generation of Army leaders. Many of today's general officers and colonels read the book early in their careers, and because of that, the book has profoundly influenced the shape and character of the post-Vietnam US Army. Re-reading the book allows today's senior leaders to reflect on the course of their own careers.

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HONORABLE WARRIOR: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command by Lewis Sorley. 364 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1998. \$39.95.

General Harold K. Johnson, Bataan Death March survivor and recipient of the Distinguished Service Cross in Korea, was named chief of staff of the US Army in 1964 and served in that position until retirement in 1968. During his tenure, he presided over the turbulent and controversy-filled period of the US military's early involvement and buildup in Vietnam. It is this period, far more than for his service in World War II and Korea, for which Johnson is remembered.

Sorley devotes one-half of *Honorable Warrior* to Johnson's role in developing a military response to President Lyndon B. Johnson's ambivalence toward Vietnam. Harold Johnson was a deeply religious man who struggled to reconcile the dif-

ferences between his loyalty to the president, whose desire was to fight the war "on the cheap," and his own recognition that such a policy could only lead to military disaster.

The general was caught up in the conflict between the president, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler and the other Chiefs. The President was attempting to emphasize his Great Society program while de-emphasizing the growing war in Southeast Asia. McNamara was attempting to fight that war based on statistical analysis and cared little about military judgment. Wheeler was unwilling to challenge either the president's or the secretary's faulty concepts of warfighting. The other Chiefs were attempting to elevate their own services over any meaningful consensus or unified position regarding the proper military strategy for the war. Unfortunately, Sorley only superficially addresses this tangle of conflicting viewpoints.

H.R. McMaster points out in *Dereliction of Duty* (HarperCollins, Scranton, PA, 1997) that the professional relationship among the Chiefs was so colored by parochialism they were ineffective as a body. Their internal conflicts were so acrimonious that the president and McNamara were able to proceed down the road to military disaster with little opposition.

One question that haunts historians, particularly those who understand the conflict between loyalty to the Constitution and the nation and loyalty to one's convictions, is why the Joint Chiefs, including General Johnson, did not resign in protest over the flawed policies taking the nation to war in Vietnam. Several times Sorley describes the contempt in which the Chiefs were held by their civilian superiors. Once the president cursed them and told them to "get the hell out of my office" when they expressed their concerns. In another instance, the Chiefs attempted to persuade McNamara of the criticality of calling up the Reserve Components. Believing they had his support, they attended a White House meeting in which the president announced he would not

take such an action and McNamara supported him. According to Sorley, the Chiefs "sat through this meeting in shocked silence."

It is General Johnson's silence that so frustrates those who recognize his honor and integrity. They are left wondering why he did not speak up more forcefully or resign in protest. Sorley acknowledges that the general was in anguish over the course of events. But, with the other Chiefs, General Johnson concluded that if he or they resigned, their successors would be lackeys for the civilian leaders rather than soldiers who would stand fast and give their honest opinions. However, the result was that they, in fact, became the lackeys themselves. General Johnson later recognized his fault: "I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage on my back."

To understand the military's entry into Vietnam, one must understand the thinking of that era's military and civilian leaders. Sorley provides a valuable resource to help historians better understand the still highly controversial time in the nation's history. To fully understand Harold Johnson's role and fault in determining US military policy toward the Vietnam War, Sorley's book should be read along with analyses of the Joint Chiefs' interactions and critical reviews of McNamara's role as secretary of defense.

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
CIGARS, WHISKEY & WINNING: Leadership Lessons From Ulysses S. Grant by Al Kaltman. 336 pages. Prentice Hall Press, Paramus, NJ. 1998. \$22.00.

Cigars, Whiskey & Winning: Leadership Lessons From Ulysses S. Grant is an analysis of management techniques derived from Grant's military leadership during the Civil War. The book is an interesting, well-written account of "life lessons" and their impact on Grant's war-fighting decisions. Each lesson begins with a short vignette of Grant in action and concludes with a lesson learned. The first lesson begins with Grant registering as a cadet at the

US Military Academy. The final lesson shows an ex-president Grant struggling to complete his memoirs.

Grant's leadership qualities of determination, persistence, common sense, clarity of purpose and mastery of detail without the sacrifice of a larger vision are equally relevant to today's study of leadership. The lessons provide the reader with a look into the life of an ordinary and flawed man who transformed himself into a progressive leader.

Author Al Kaltman describes



Grant as a pragmatist who learned from his own and others' successes and as a man who brought new dimension to strategic planning. Kaltman views Grant as a man who was adept at seizing and exploiting opportunities as they presented themselves, boldly shattering paradigms long before the term made its way into leadership jargon.

Serious students of leadership would welcome a cogent examination and discussion of the character traits and basic core beliefs of one of America's greatest military leaders. Kaltman's abridged discussion, however, moves too quickly from one topic to the next and manages to generate more questions than answers or insights. Neither the vignettes nor the lessons learned are portrayed in the text as coming from Grant. In fact, Kaltman acknowledges in the chapter titled "Addendum" that, during his presidency, Grant failed to use many of the

managerial lessons he must have learned as a successful general. Kaltman must assume that Grant would have realized the lessons learned as described in the text. However, he fails to provide any evidence that Grant, as general or president, took time to reflect on his managerial or leadership skills.

This book does provide great opportunity for readers to gain a better understanding of their own leadership and management skills. Kaltman attempts to capture compelling leadership lessons that are currently relevant. However, the depth to which he presses his analysis limits his success. The brief lesson statements sometimes read like those of Sun Tsu. They are broad-brushed and require considerable thought by the reader on how to implement them in day-to-day practical application.

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CRIPPLED EAGLE: A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special Operations, 1976-1996, by Rod Lenahan. 273 pages. Narwhal Press, Inc., Charleston, SC. 1998. \$19.95.


Readers looking for a comprehensive history of US special operations from 1976 to 1996 will not find one in this book, but it does have some redeeming qualities. We get a "smidgen" of information about current special operations force structure and a cursory chronology of special operations at the end of the book. Otherwise, the reader gets a great history of how and why the US military has a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Retired US Air Force Colonel Rod Lenahan provides rare insight into the reasons why this little-known command is nestled in the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. And, after the journey through this history, the reader understands why past JSOC commanders have become top military leaders.

Crippled Eagle is a history of US military response to the 1979-1980 Iran-US Embassy hostage crisis

that resulted in the initial rescue mission's cancellation at "Desert One." The book fills in the entire planning, preparation and execution panorama, whereas Charlie Beckwith and Donald Knox's book *Delta Force* (out of print) and James H. Kyle's *Guts to Try* (out of print) provide narrow service perspectives of some specialized US Army and Air Force unit leaders. Lenahan, Joint Task Force (JTF) 1-79's intelligence officer, offers an insider's commentary on the JTF's formation, tribulations, training and operations.

To those who have participated in "pick up and go" military task forces, this book offers familiar recollections. Joint planning and training become real to the reader when Lenahan provides declassified memorandums showing how the "bill collectors" were managed by the JTF's boss through the service chief and theater command bill payers while operational security was maintained.

The most disturbing images are those concerning how the United States lacked human assets to gather



information in the target area and to provide critical logistic support during the operation. For all the paranoia about the Central Intelligence Agency's being "everywhere," it, just as every other agency, was unable to be everywhere to conduct or support covert operations in the area. This impotence resulted from a belief in technical means as a replacement for comparatively "unreliable" humans. By casting a wide net over all the military services, exceedingly

brave and ingenious people were hastily provided. These uncelebrated few gave the United States the chance to conduct the rescue attempt, even though it failed because of inadequate technical support.

What is special about Lenahan's "field report" is how the US military went from "quick fix" and "catch up" in the early 1970s to develop an efficient, stand-alone, joint organization for dealing with terrorism. The military actually learned and applied lessons from that incomplete first large hostage rescue effort. The 1986 *Goldwater-Nichols Act* gave the military the budget and command authority to provide an institutionalized command organization for procuring equipment, organizing and training mission-ready joint teams and commanding and controlling special operations forces from all services to combat terrorism and support theater commanders' operations in all levels of warfare.

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